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Abstract: This study investigates the factors that determine producers’ participation in 
agri-environment (AE) extension activities and their adoption of best management 
practices (BMPs) in Quebec (Canada). Data were collected from farmers in telephone 
interviews and the impacts of AE extension activities were analyzed using average 
treatment effect and local average treatment effect, estimated with non-parametric 
approaches. The average effects of AE extension activities are statistically significant for 
the majority of BMPs. We also find a statistically significant formal diffusion effect of 
producer‘s membership in an AE advisory club. The informal diffusion effect is 
statistically significant for BMPs that have visible impacts.  
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Agri-Environment Advisory Activities and Best Management Practices Adoption: A 
Nonparametric Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
Concerns about climate change, biodiversity and water pollution have heightened interest in 
mitigating the environmental consequences of agriculture through best management practices 
(BMPs).1 However, given the voluntary nature of the adoption of most conservation practices, 
farmers need to decide whether to adopt BMPs or not. Agri-environment (AE) extension activities 
attracted considerable interest because of their capability to improve the performance of 
producers in the delivery of ecological goods and services (EGS)2 through BMPs. The farms’ 
response to AE extension activities is thus a critical factor in determining the relative merits of 
alternative policies, together with key factors that govern BMP adoption, and ultimately, the 
supply of EGS.  
There is a large body of literature regarding the determinants of adoption of BMPs in agriculture. 
Prokopy et al. (2008) provide a detailed survey with a focus on the United States. These authors 
review 25 years of literature to examine general trends in the categories of capacity, awareness, 
attitudes and farm characteristics. They conclude “…the results are clearly inconclusive on what 
factors consistently determine BMP adoption” (p. 308). Darr and Pretzsch (2006) and Knowler and 
Bradshaw (2007) find that formal and informal groups are important even if they do not know 
whether it is the access to information provided through social networks or the influence of social 
networks on subjective norms that affects adoption behavior. In addition, educational 
                                                 
1
 For example, using a hydrologic Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model, Michaud et al. (2006) 
identify sustainable cropping practices likely to help meet the target phosphorus (P) load. Tested BMPs 
include the implementation of sustainable cropping practices, the conversion of a specific portion of the 
territory to cover crops or permanent prairie land, investments in the protection of flood plains and riparian 
strips, the rapid soil incorporation of manure…. 
2
 According to Daily (1997), ecosystems goods are tangible material products that result from ecosystem 
processes. Brown, Bergstrom and Loomis (2007: 332) define ecosystem services as “…the specific results of 
… processes that either directly sustain or enhance human life… or maintain the quality of ecosystem goods.”  
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opportunities seem to increase directly adoption rates through awareness and information 
dissemination.  
Nonetheless, an important methodological problem that has not addressed sufficiently by many of 
the previous studies on BMPs adoption is the bias related to potential participation to formal and 
informal groups’ activities. Correlation between participation in activities and BMP adoption could 
be due to a positive effect caused by the participation in activities. There could also be a self-
selection effect if farmers that already have more positive environmental attitudes than their 
peers do participate more eagerly in such activities (see Salhofer and Streicher, 2005). To resolve 
this selectivity problem, one could use an instrumental variables (IV) approach, wherein an 
instrument that is correlated with participation in activities but is uncorrelated with BMP adoption 
is used.3 However, identification and estimation is more complicated when the partial effect 
depends on unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, farmers have different attitudes towards new 
technologies, risk and uncertainty, all of which might influence their adoption decision. Therefore, 
adopters and non-adopters may differ significantly in unobserved variables, which might lead to 
bias when analyzing BMP adoption (Strauss et al., 1991; Owens et al., 2003; Feder, Murgai and 
Quizon, 2004). The focus is typically on estimating the average partial effect (APE), which is the 
partial effect averaged across the population distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.4 When 
the endogenous variable is binary, such as participation in a program, the average partial effect is 
called the average treatment effect (ATE). This concept, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), is based on the fact that only one of the potential outcomes is ever observed for each 
producer. In the setting of a voluntary program where those not enrolled will never be required to 
                                                 
3
 Crost et al. (2007) use fixed effects to control for the selectivity problem. This approach cannot be used in 
situations where only cross-sectional data are available.  
4
 A popular model where the endogenous explanatory variable interacts with unobserved heterogeneity is the 
switching regression model (e.g., Maddala, 1983), which has received considerable attention recently in the 
program evaluation literature. 
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participate in the program, the average treatment effect on treated (ATET) is the estimand of most 
interest (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  
The aim of the paper is to identify how AE extension activities affect the adoption of BMPs of a 
farmer compared with what he would have experienced if he had not participated. We use the 
concept of ATET to evaluate the effect of AE extension activities on the adoption of BMPs. The 
estimated ATET is the expected effect on BMP adoption of AE extension activities on a farm 
randomly drawn from the subpopulation of farms who participate in extension activities 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Participation in AE extension activities is proxied by adopting an AE support 
plan. In addition, we hypothesize that membership in an AE advisory club has an impact on the 
probability to adopt a support plan. We quantify the potential vertical (i.e. formal) and horizontal 
(i.e. informal) diffusion effects on BMPs adoption of the membership to an AE advisory club. We 
do so using the concept of local average treatment effect (LATE) suggested by Imbens and Angrist 
(1994). In the LATE, the effect of treatment changes in response to an instrumental variable. Thus, 
the LATE measures the average treatment effect among those who alter their treatment status 
because they react to the instrument. We use farmers’ membership as instrument when 
estimating the vertical diffusion effect of AE advisory clubs network activities. The LATE, by 
restricting the analysis to the subpopulation of farmers who react to membership, estimates the 
vertical (i.e. formal) impact of AE advisory clubs network on the adoption of BMPs. We made the 
same reasoning when studying the informal diffusion effect of the AE advisory clubs network. The 
“vicinity” is used as instrument and, thus, the estimated LATE is the mean effect on BMPs 
adoption of knowing farmers who are members of an AE advisory club.  
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Most models assume additive separability in the error term; hence, they assume a constant 
treatment effect for individual farms with the same value of covariates. Additively separable 
models thus rule out unobserved heterogeneity and are not appropriate given the objectives of 
the study at hand. Thus, in our estimation procedures, we use non-parametric approaches.5 They 
avoid delicate functional form and independence assumptions. In addition, the endogeneity of 
regressors that are not of main interest may not affect the estimated relationship between the 
regressor of interest and the outcome (Frölich, 2006). We apply the non-parametric IV estimation 
of LATE with covariates proposed by Frölich (2007). Applying Frölich’s (2007) approach, we allow 
for confounding factors, that is, factors that influence the potential probability to adopt and the 
decision to participate in AE extension activities and the instrument (membership or “vicinity”). 
We then try to mitigate some of the difficulties of improper instrumental variable because of 
inadequate covariates.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The section 2 describes a simple 
model of participation in AE extension activities and presents our empirical approach. Section 3 
outlines aspects of our data. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the estimations and 
the last section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Methodological Approach 
2.1. Conceptual framework: a simple model of participation decision 
In this section, we present a model of participation in AE extension activities and BMPs adoption 
that gives an economic interpretation of the treatment effects that we estimate. Our simplified 
                                                 
5
 Non-parametric empirical applications when evaluating policies in the agricultural context are limited. 
Examples are Godtland et al. (2004), Lynch, Gray and Geoghegan (2007), Lynch and Liu (2007) and Pufahl 
and Weiss (2009). 
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framework assumes that the producer maximizes utility function that depends on his consumption 
c  and his quality of life, ℏ :6  
(1) ( )( ), , |ι= a nau u c g g ℏ         
where ag  is the producer consumption of an agricultural good and nag  a vector of non-
agricultural good. The producer heterogeneity is captured by the parameter ι . The production 
function is:  
(2) ( ), 0≥i a eq q q        
where aq  is the level of production of the agricultural good and eq  is the level of production of 
ecological goods and services which is produced jointly with agricultural good using the following 
technology: 
(3) ( ) ( )( ),=e aq f q eŻ Ż  
where the parameters Ż  and e  are respectively the vector of adopted BMPs and participation in 
AE extension activities. We assume that 0∂ ∂ ≥eŻ  and 0∂ ∂ ≥eq Ż . However, the direction of 
the impact of Ż  in the level of production of the agricultural good is unknown a priori. Finally, the 
quality of life is “produced” according to the following production technology: 
(4) ( )( ), ,.e eh q qα=ℏ  
where α  represents the “ambient” level of EGS. Then, EGS is a private commodity as is a public 
commodity because of the existence of public spillovers. We assume that 0∂ ∂ ≥eqℏ .  
                                                 
6
 The framework used in the present paper is close to Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) households’ behavior 
modeling under market failures and Harrington and Portney (1987) or Jakus (1994) models of defensive 
behavior. One of the key issues when modeling farmers’ behavior is whether production decisions are 
independent from consumption and other utility-related decisions. If farmers face inputs and/or outputs 
markets imperfections or other resource constraints, optimal production decisions may entail meeting 
household consumption objectives without market intermediation (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). This is the 
case for EGS because the lack of markets for most of the EGS. In addition, there is joint-effect, reduction of 
pollutant affecting the welfare of producer through their production function and their health. To focus only 
on the most relevant aspect, we abstract from certain considerations. 
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Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) provide a simplified behavioral model of farmers’ decisions. The 
decision of participation in AE extension activities contributes to utility through the preference 
effect and, as they change the price function, through the production effect because of joint 
production of agricultural goods and EGS. The estimated treatment effects are the total effect and 
there will be heterogeneity in the effect of AE extension activities even if the production effect is 
the same. Depending on the concavity or convexity of ∂ ∂u e , the average effect of participating 
in AE extension activities can be positive, negative, or zero. We model participation as a discrete 
choice, where the observed choice is an expression of a continuous latent variable reflecting the 
propensity to choose a specific option among different alternatives. Farmers will adopt a BMP if 
they believe that it will enhance their utility, all others factors considered. They then weigh -with 
varying uncertainty- the costs and benefits of the adopted practice to determine the degree to 
which the BMP will affect other facets of their daily life, specifically, whether the BMP is 
compatible with their habits and values. 
 
2.2. Estimation methods  
Average treatment effect of the participation in AE extension activities  
Participation in AE extension activities is modeled as a discrete choice taking the value of 1 when 
the producer participates and 0 otherwise. The estimated average treatment effect (ATE) is the 
expected effect that farmers have gained because of their participation in AE extension activities.  
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To define the ATE and following the notation of Frölich (2007), let us consider the model: 
(5) ( ), ,i i i ieϕ ε= xŻ  
(6) ( ),ς υ=i i ie x  
where { }0,1∈Ż  is the adoption variable taking the value of 1Ż  when the BMP is adopted and 0Ż  
when it is not; { }0,1∈e  is the fact that the producer participate in AE extension activities 
assumed to be endogenous; ε  and υ  are unobserved variables, and ix  is the vector of observed 
covariates.7 The expected ATE is defined as: 
(7) ( ) ( )| 1 | 0ATE E e E e= = − =Ż Ż  
where E represents the expectation symbol. The treatment effect is estimated non-parametrically 
using propensity-score matching estimators and given a conditional dependence assumption 
(Frölich, 2006):  
(8) ( ) ( ){ }1 0
1
1
ˆ ˆτ τ
=
−∑
n
i i
i
m m
n
 
where ( )ˆ ⋅em  is a non-parametric regression estimator of 
( ) ( )| ,em E BMP Participation eτ ρ⋅ = = = =  xŻ  conditional on the propensity score 
( ) ( )1|τ = = =P e Xx x .8 The estimator of the treatment in (8) is consistent provided that ˆ em  is 
consistent and that the support of x  are identical in the subpopulations where 0=e  and 1=e . 
                                                 
7
 The causal interpretation of ϕ  is that for a farmer unit i the variables ε i , υi  and ix  are defined by nature 
and ie  and iŻ  are determined by (5) and (6) respectively.  
8
 The propensity score is defined as the probability of adoption for the farm i given a set of farm 
characteristics. We assume additive separability of treatment effects and ignore potential interaction effects 
between different BMPs adoption. Matching and weighting by the propensity score have the advantage that 
they do not require high-dimensional non-parametric regression of the mean outcome (Frölich, 2007). Pufahl 
and Weiss (2009) use a pair matching estimator in a study of AE programs in Germany. In the present study 
we use a ridge matching estimator. Usually, ridge matching was the best estimator (lower mean square error) 
particularly in small samples (Frölich, 2004). Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide a recent revue of 
matching methods. 
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However, given the voluntary nature of the participation in AE extension activities, the estimated 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is most of interest. The ATET is the expected effect 
that participants in AE extension activities have gained because of their participation:  
(9) ( ) ( )1 0| 1 | 1ATET E e E e= = − =Ż Ż  
The ATET is obtained by dividing the estimated ATE - weighted by the propensity score - by the 
probability of a positive participation.  
 
Average treatment effect of the AE advisory clubs network 
As Rogers (2003) asserts, social systems can be characterized as heterophilous or homophilous. 
Heterophilous social systems tend to encourage change from system norms. There is interaction 
between people from different backgrounds introducing a vertical and formal linkage system. 
Homophilous social systems tend toward system norms. Most interaction within them is between 
people from similar backgrounds in a horizontal system. People and ideas that differ from the 
norm appear strange and undesirable.  
Heterophilous linkage that can increase access to information and BMP adoption is studied using 
the instrumental variable (IV) estimation of LATE and membership in an AE advisory club as an 
instrument. As describe in Table A1, producers can be distinguished into four types according to 
their reaction at an external intervention, i.e., membership in an advisory club (see Imbens and 
Ingrist, 1994): never-participant, complier, defier and always-participant.  The compliers are 
farmers who participate in AE extension activities because they adhered in an AE advisory club. 
Consistent with Heckman’s (1997) definition, the estimated LATE measures the expected effect on 
the probability to adopt, of the change in participation in AE extension activities because of 
adhesion in an AE advisory club.  
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To define the non-parametric LATE estimator let us now consider the following triangular model: 
(10) ( ), , ,i i i i ie zϕ ε= xŻ  
(11) ( ), ,ς υ=i i i ie z x  
where { }0,1z =  is the membership status taking the value of 1 if the producer is a member of a 
club and 0 otherwise; the other variables have been defined above. The LATE is :9  
(12) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )1 0| 1 | 0LATE E e z e z= = − = −Ż Ż Ż Ż  
Frölich (2007) define the propensity score matching estimator of a LATE model as: 
(13) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 0
1 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
τ τ
τ τ
τ τ
ϖ
µ τ µ τ
−
=
−
∑
∑
i ii
i ii
m m
 
where τˆ i  is the propensity score estimator; ( )ˆ ⋅zm  and ( )µˆ ⋅z  are the nonparametric estimators 
of the conditional mean function ( ) ( )| ,zm E BMP zτ ρ⋅ = = =  xŻ  and 
( ) ( )| ,µ τ ρ⋅ = = =  z E Participation e zx   respectively.
10  
Beside the estimated LATE, the fractions of compliers and never-participants are estimands of 
interest. They are given, respectively, by equations (14) and (15): 
(14) ( ) [ ] [ ]( )Pr | , 1 | , 0 xc E Participation z E Participation z dFϖ = = = − =∫ x x  
(15) ( ) [ ]( )Pr 1 | , 1 xn E Participation z dFϖ = = − =∫ x  
                                                 
9
  Using membership as an instrument for participation in extension activities, assuming that membership is 
exogenous from adoption, will return the effect of extension activities for farms who adoption are highly 
affected by membership. These farms are likely to respond more dramatically to change in participation status 
than the average farm. 
10
 Estimations of the ATE and the LATE are made using the Gauss codes of Frölich available at 
http://froelich.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/1357.0.html?&L=1.  Accessed March 3, 2009. 
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IV does not identify the expected average treatment effects for the always-participants and the 
never-participants. Nevertheless, using the results of Frölich and Lechner (2006), we can identify 
the expected treatment outcome for the always-participants by 
(16) 
( )
( )
1
| , 0
|
| , 0
x
x
E Participation z dF
E a
E Participation z dF
=   = =  =  
∫
∫
Ż
Ż ϖ
x
x
 
and the non-treatment outcome of the never-participants by 
(17) 
( )
( )
0
1 | , 1
|
1 | , 1
x
x
E Participation z dF
E n
E Participation z dF
− =   = =  − =  
∫
∫
Ż
Ż ϖ
x
x
 
We made the same reasoning for informal, i.e. homophilous, diffusion impact of AE advisory clubs 
network. The “vicinity” is used as instrumental variable. Nevertheless, whether living close to or 
far from a member of an AE advisory club is an active choice, that choice, however, might itself be 
related to characteristics that affect the decision to adopt or not a given BMP. The estimated LATE 
measures the expected impact in adoption caused by the change in participation in AE extension 
activities because of living close to a member of an AE advisory club. 
 
Finally, in line with Viet (2008), Frölich and Lechner (2006) and Behrman, Cheng and Todd (2004), 
confidence intervals (CI) of the treatment effects are simulated using bootstrapping methods. The 
problem is that the distribution from which estimates of ATET and LATE originate is unknown; so 
standard errors are not determinable (Behrman et al., 2004; Reynolds and DesJardins, 2009). The 
bootstrap consisted in drawing with replacement from the original sample and repeating the 
entire estimation process (see Brownstone and Valleta, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002).11 The percentile 
                                                 
11
 Politis, Wolf and Romano (1999) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) provide a proof on the validity of this 
approach of subsampling. 
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approach is used to construct the 95% bootstrapped CI of the treatment effects (Davidson and 
Hinkley, 1997). 
 
3. Data and definition of variables 
Data are from a survey implemented between February and March 2009. The year of reference 
was 2008 and the dataset consists to 200 observations. Definition of variables used and their 
corresponding summary statistics are listed in Table A2.  
Producers Attributes  
The residence location (Residence), the level of education (Education), the gender (Gender) and 
the age (Age) of the primary producer are modeled through dummy variables that take a value of 
zero or one. Five age groups were formed: <35, [35;45[, [45;55[, [55;65[ and ≥65. Residence takes 
a value of one when the producer lives on his farm as does Gender when the primary producer is a 
female. Education takes the value of 1 when secondary school is completed and 0 otherwise. 
Environmental awareness (Environmental) may be an important determinant when considering 
BMP adoption. It is proxied by a variable that takes a value of 1 if the primary farm operator has 
participated in a biodiversity conservation program and/or has a perception of a decrease in 
biodiversity and 0 otherwise. We introduce farm management experience (Experience) through a 
continuous variable. Finally, access to and use of technical information (Information) is introduced 
through a binary variable that takes the value of one when the primary producer has used the 
information provided by the Phytosanitary Alert Network (Pan) and 0 otherwise. 
Farm attributes 
The main production is divided into 6 groups: bovine production, milk production, hog production, 
other animal productions, cereals and other crop productions. We introduce the main productions 
through binary variables. The farm size is proxied by its total gross revenue (TGR). The TGR 
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(Revenue) is grouped into five categories: <$50,000, [$50,000;$100,000[, [$100,000;$250,000[, 
[$250,000;$500,000[, ≥$500,000. The potential impact of farm specialization is estimated using 
the contribution of the main production to the TGR (Share). It is introduced through a continuous 
variable with values between 0 and 1. Type of farm (Ownership) is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the farm is individually owned and 0 otherwise. The share of rented land (Rent) is 
introduced through a continuous variable taking values between 0 and 1. Land quality (Land) is 
introduced through a binary variable. It takes the value of 1 if the producer has observed land 
degradation due to water or wind.   
External characteristics 
Geographical region (Region) is considered through categorical variables without a particular 
order. River quality (River) is introduced through binary variables. River takes the value of 1 if the 
producer has observed sediments or pollutants in the rivers or if the banks of the rivers are 
degraded. Finally, the variable Loss takes the value of 1 if the producer has experienced 
destruction of his production by animals or plants; otherwise, Loss takes the value of 0. 
Participation in AE extension Activities 
The participation of producers in AE extension activities is proxied by their adoption of a 
comprehensive environment tool called AE support plan. Quebec’s minister of agriculture 
introduced it in order to help producers to enhance their environmental performances.12 It is a 
voluntary process realized with the assistance of an advisor. The AE support plan is modeled as a 
discrete choice taking the value of one when the producer has a support plan and zero otherwise. 
47.37% of producers have a support plan and 36% are members of the AE advisory clubs 
                                                 
12
 The AE support plan is based on a scan that evaluates (i) the disposal capacity of fertilizers; (ii) whether a 
farm’s AE practices comply with regulatory requirements; and (iii) other farming practices that involve the 
environment (e.g., erosion control, odor reduction, and optimization of pesticide use). During the process, the 
priorities identified by the farm and its particular business features are taken into account (MAPAQ, 2003).  
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network.13 In addition, 40.34% of producers that are not members of an advisory clubs claimed to 
have a neighbor or a friend that is a member. In that case, the variable vicinity take the value of 1 
and 0 otherwise. 
BMPs  
Six BMPs are analyzed and are all introduced through binary variables that take the value of 1 if 
the BMP is adopted and 0 otherwise. The first studied BMP is related to compliance with the 
regulatory norms on soil and manure analyses. It takes the value of 1 if the analyses was done in 
the last 12 months for manure and 5 years for soil. Producer adoption decisions regarding 
conservation tillage is studied. Consistent with Davey and Furtan (2008), we define conservation 
tillage as tillage that retains most of the previous crop residue on soil surface including zero tillage. 
The BMP associated with the management of manure takes the value of 1 when the manure is 
injected into the soil within 24 hours of the initial spreading and 0 otherwise. The establishment 
and maintenance of a riparian buffer zone takes a value of 1 when a riparian buffer zone larger 
than one meter is established and maintained and 0 otherwise. The BMP related to the use of 
mineral fertilizers is studied. It takes the value of 1 if the producers do not use mineral fertilizers. 
Otherwise, the value is zero. Finally, investment in the construction of run-off control structures 
(hydraulic infrastructures) is studied.  
Table 1 presents preliminary analysis of the analyzed BMPs. It shows that the proportions of 
adopters are different – significant at 5% level – in the subpopulations of producers with and 
without a support plan. When the comparison is based on membership in an AE advisory club, the 
results are more mixed. 
                                                 
13
 Environmental responsibilities of Quebec farmers have arisen from various AE initiatives that inspired the 
creation of AE advisory clubs in 1993. Today, the network has more than 8,300 members grouped into 83 
clubs and served by more than 300 advisors. It has the strong support of the Ministère de l’Agriculture, des 
Pêcheries et de l’Alimentation du Québec (MAPAQ) and the Union des producteurs agricoles (UPA). A 
description of the AE advisory clubs network activities is available at 
http://www.clubsconseils.org/accueil/affichage.asp?B=763. Accessed April 8, 2009.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Factors affecting the decision of participation in AE extension activities 
Factors affecting the decision of participating in AE extension activities, proxied by the adoption of 
an AE support plan, are estimated using non-parametric Probit. Table A3 presents the results. 
Results show that age has a negative impact for one class while that effect is statistically non-
significant for the other classes. Farmers aged between 45 and 55 are found to have a 44.1% lower 
probability of participating in AE extension services compared with farmers age 45 and under. 
Farmers that have completed secondary school and have more experience with farm management 
have a higher probability of participating, as do farmers with environmental awareness, which 
increases the probability of deciding to have an AE support plan by 27.4%.14  
Only the smallest farms, i.e., with TGR below $50,000, have a lower probability of adopting an AE 
support plan. They are 30.4% less likely to use a support plan than the median class. For the other 
classes of TGR, the differences are statistically non-significant. It is also the case for bovine, milk, 
hog and cereal productions. However, there is a difference for the other animal and crop 
productions, with 39.8% and 37% less probability, respectively, of participating in AE extension 
activities compared with hog production, the base production. As expected, having observed soil 
degradation has a positive marginal effect; it increases the probability of having AE support plan 
by 23.5%. Finally, the degradation of rivers and the geographical location of the farm have a 
statistically non-significant effect on the probability of having a support plan.  
 
                                                 
14
 Kaiser, Wolfing and Fuhrer (1999) indicate that awareness of environmental concerns usually precedes the 
adoption of a desirable attitude about the issue of interest. Although, Kaiser et al. (1999) do not find strong 
relationship between behaviour and awareness. In developing countries context, Ecobichon (2001) and Heong 
et al. (2002) also report a general awareness of chemical inputs secondary effects but not necessarily an 
influence farmers’ production behaviour. Tucker and Napier (2001) find that although some Midwestern US 
farmers were aware of potential negative consequences of chemical inputs use, this awareness does not 
necessarily influence farmers’ production behaviour. 
 
  
 
15
4.2. Average effect of AE extension activities  
For each studied BMP, the estimated ATET measures AE extension activities’ impact on the 
expected probability of adopting for the subgroup of producers with an AE support plan. A positive 
value of the ATET suggests that the subgroup of producers with a support plan have a greater 
probability to adopt because of having it. Table 2 reports ATET and their corresponding 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.  
The average positive impact is higher for the immediate incorporation of manure. The value of 
0.128 indicates that participating in AE extension activities increases the probability of adopting by 
12.8%. A possible explanation is that extension activities can show that adopting immediate 
incorporation of manure can generate private gains (specifically material and energy savings) as 
well as environmental gains (reduction of pollutant, e.g., phosphorus and nitrogen, and, manure 
odours). Because of increasingly stringent regulations and growth in rural residential areas, 
diligence in environmental protection has become a major consideration for farmers as reported 
by Deaton et al. (2005). The (positive) average impact on the adoption of hydraulic infrastructures 
and the non-use of mineral fertilizers are also important, respectively at 9.7% and 8.9%. The latter 
result corresponds to Pufahl and Weiss (2009) who observe a reduction (9.4% of expenditures) in 
fertilizers expenditures when studying the impact of AE programs15 in Germany.  
For conservation tillage, although statistically significant, the positive impact of AE extension 
activities is lower. This could be due to the mixed results of studies of the impact of this BMP on 
the profitability of farms.16 The average impact on the adoption of soil and manure analyses is the 
lowest of statistically significant impact. This is an expected result because this BMP is related to 
                                                 
15
 However, the analyzed AE programs are measures in which farmers receive compensation payments for the 
adoption of BMPs (Pufhal and Weiss, 2009). 
16
 Smith et al. (1996) indicates that conservation tillage is not economically competitive while Mooney and 
Williams (2007) shows that it is under some circumstances. 
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compliance with the regulatory norms and is suggested to farmers few years ago. Finally, AE 
extension activities have no statistically significant impact for the establishment and the 
maintenance of a riparian buffer zone.17  
Overall, our results show that, for most of the studied BMPs, the AE support plan reached its 
objective, i.e., help producers to enhance their environmental performances. 
 
4.3. Average effects of the AE advisory clubs network 
Average heterophilous effect of the AE advisory clubs network  
The estimated fraction of never-participants is 0.283 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.156; 0.429]. 
It indicates that 28.3% of farmers, who do not participate in AE extension activities, will not 
change their status even if they join an AE advisory club. The compliers are farmers who use an AE 
support plan because of membership in an AE advisory club. Their estimated fraction is 0.344 with 
a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.185; 0.484]. 34.4% of farmers in the database react to membership in 
an AE advisory club by the adoption of an AE support plan.  
Table 3 reports the results of the estimated LATE of compliers with their corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals. The estimated LATE are positive and statistically significant for the majority 
of the studied BMPs indicating a vertical linkage that can increase access to information and the 
spread of ideas. The values of the ATET (see Table 2) and the LATE (see Table 3) are different 
indicating a non homogenous treatment effect of adherence to an AE advisory club. The 
differences between estimated ATET and LATE imply that farmers decisions to react to adhesion is 
based on factors that also determine the gains of AE extensions activities (Heckman, 1997). 
                                                 
17
 From an individual landowner’s perspective, benefits may not clearly outweigh cost when establishing and 
maintaining a riparian buffer zone (see Brethour et al., 2007).  
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Although the AE advisory clubs network has adopted the support plan as a working tool, the 
estimated LATE provide only a measure the effectiveness of the network.18  
Soil and manure analyses realization is the BMP with the greatest average impact of membership 
in an AE advisory club. The result of 71.7% (LATE=0.717) is the expected mean effect on the 
probability of adoption of analyses for farmers that decide to use an AE support plan because they 
are members of an AE advisory club. The probability of adoption is, on average, augmented by 
71.7%. This is quite a large effect but expected because this BMP is related to compliance with 
regulatory norms. In a report on the evaluation of the AE advisory clubs network activities, 
Sogémap (2007) indicates that adherence is largely due to regulatory reasons at 67%. The 
treatment outcome for the always-participants is 0.972 while it the non-treatment outcome for 
the never-participants is 0.999 for soil and manure analyses. These results indicate a small 
difference in the average probability to adopt for the two groups even if we expect a negative 
treatment effect for both groups.  
The estimated LATE of the adoption of conservation tillage, the non-use of mineral fertilizers and 
the construction of hydraulic infrastructures are also important indicating a statistically significant 
effect of the AE advisory clubs network activities on the level of adoption. However, the results 
indicate statistically non-significant effects for the injection of manure into the soil within 24 hours 
of the initial spreading and riparian buffer zone establishment and maintenance (see Table 3). This 
result is consistent with Prokopy et al. (2008) who also report inconclusive relationship of 
networking and the decision to adopt some of BMPs related to livestock management, landscape 
management and soil management. Nevertheless, Sobels, Curtis and Lokie (2001) find that 
increase in social capital play a role in the success of Landcare program in Australia. 
 
                                                 
18
 As mentioned by Heckman (1997), the LATE assumes that the external intervention has no effect on the 
non-switchers.  
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Average homophiilous effect of the AE advisory clubs network 
The estimated fraction of never-participants is 0.460 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.393; 0.524]. 
It indicates that 46% of farmers, who do not participate in AE extension activities, will not change 
their status even if “vicinity” with a member of an AE advisory club. The estimated fraction of 
compliers is lower than for the membership at 0.220 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.044; 0.38]. 
Twenty two percent of farmers in the database react to “vicinity” by the adoption of an AE support 
plan. 
Table 4 reports the horizontal diffusion impact of the AE advisory clubs network. For the entire 
population of producer, we try to identify the gain from knowing at least one member of an AE 
advisory club. Positive significant impacts are found for the implementation of riparian buffer, the 
construction of hydraulic infrastructures and the non-use of mineral fertilizers at 22.7%, 14.9% and 
4.7% respectively. Interestingly, for the two first BMPs, the effects are visible suggesting that “visit 
and training” as an approach to the extension may be efficient when promoting BMPs adoption. 
The statistically non-significant impact for immediate incorporation of manure is expected given 
the results of the formal diffusion effects. Our results show a negative impact of the “vicinity” on 
the conservation tillage. We had no expectation about the direction of the impact of the “vicinity” 
because of the mixed results of the economics studies about the profitability of conservation 
tillage.19 The “vicinity” has a non-significant impact on the realization of manure and soils analyses.  
 
                                                 
19
 See footnote 16. 
  
 
19
5. Conclusion 
This study investigated the factors determining producers’ participation in agri-environmental 
extension services and its impact on the adoption of various best management practices (BMPs). 
The participation in AE extension activities is proxied by Quebec farmers’ adoption of an AE 
support plan. Data was collected from farmers through a telephone interview conducted in 
February and March 2009. Collected data include producer and farm characteristics, along with 
external features that can affect participation in AE extension activities. We analyze the link 
between the use of AE extension activities and the adoption of six BMPs, as was the link between 
BMP adoption and the AE advisory clubs network.    
The average impacts of the AE extension activities on BMPs adoption are estimated using average 
treatment effect on treated (ATET). In most of the BMPs, extension activities have a positive 
statistically significant impact on the probability of adopting with a higher effect for the immediate 
incorporation of manure within 24 hours of initial spreading. The AE advisory clubs network 
effects on the probabilities to adopt BMPs are estimated using the concepts of local average 
treatment effect (LATE). Membership in an AE club is used as instrumental variable when studying 
the vertical linkage (heterophilous, i.e., people with dissimilar characteristics) that can increase 
adoption. The advisory clubs network was found to have a statistically significant positive effect 
for most of the studied BMPs. Nevertheless, it has no effect on the probability to establish and to 
maintain a riparian buffer zone as is on the immediate incorporation of manure. In addition, the 
informal relationship, i.e. the possible horizontal diffusion effect of the advisory clubs is studied 
using “vicinity” as an instrumental variable. We found a positive significant diffusion effect for the 
BMPs with visible impacts.  
The number of observations used in the present study limits the extent to which the results can be 
generalized. But, clearly, our results suggest that AE extension activities and the AE advisory the 
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clubs network play an important role in disseminating information and raising awareness of BMP 
adoption and ultimately on the supply of ecological goods and services. The results also confirm 
that, like for most of the other factors affecting BMPs adoption, the treatment effects are “BMP-
specific”. Even if the non-parametric approach used in the present study is based on the 
assumption of appropriate control variables and instruments, we consider it as a useful technique 
for empirical evaluation of extension activities and/or institutions. It provides an adequate way to 
deal with the potential endogeneity and treatment heterogeneity issues of the extension and 
advisory activities when analyzing their impact on the supply of EGS. Our results suggest that 
governmental policies that invest in social capital may help create a sufficiently enabling 
environment for the adoption of BMPs.  
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Table 1. Results for z-tests (two-side) of equal proportions of BMPs’ adopters 
  AE support plan  
 
BMPs 
 non-adopters  
(Std. err.) 
 adopters  
(Std. err.) 
 z statistic  
(Prob. >|z|) 
Soil and manure analyses  0.610 (0.048)  0.977  (0.016)  -6.153 (0.000) 
Conservation tillage  0.506 (0.055)  0.683  (0.051)  -2.299 (0.022) 
Immediate incorporation  0.420 (0.059)  0.547 (0.057)  -1.516 (0.130) 
Riparian buffer   0.657 (0.048)  0.523 (0.053)  1.860 (0.063) 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.590 (0.049)  0.756 (0.045)  -2.420 (0.016) 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.654 (0.053)  0.854 (0.039)  -2.957 (0.003) 
  AE advisory clubs network 
 
BMPs 
 non-members  
(Std. err.) 
 members  
(Std. err.) 
 z statistic  
(Prob. >|z|) 
Soil and manure analyses  0.669 (0.043)  0.986 (0.014)  -5.094 (0.000) 
Conservation tillage  0.545 (0.050)  0.672 (0.059)  -1.606 (0.108) 
Immediate incorporation  0.494 (0.054)  0.474 (0.066)  0.242 (0.809) 
Riparian buffer   0.608 (0.045)  0.567 (0.061)  0.550 (0.583) 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.620 (0.044)  0.754 (0.052)  -1.884 (0.059) 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.707 (0.046)  0.828 (0.047)  -1.754 (0.079) 
 
Table 2. AE support plan average treatment effect on treated (ATET) 
BMPs  Average impact  Bootstrapped 95% CI of the average impact 
Soil and manure analyses  0.058  [ 0.034; 0.083 ] 
Conservation tillage  0.070   [ 0.010; 0.129 ] 
Immediate incorporation  0.129  [ 0.054; 0.203 ] 
Riparian buffer  -0.034  [-0.083; 0.015 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.089  [ 0.033; 0.145 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.097  [ 0.047; 0.146 ] 
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Table 3. AE advisory clubs network vertical diffusion effect  
  Mean (Sd. Err.)  95% Bootstrapped CI 
Soil and manure analyses     
 Treatment effect of the compliers (LATE)  0.717 (0.159)  [ 0.489 ; 1.029 ] 
 Non-treatment outcome of the never-adopters  1.000 (0.000)  [ 1.000 ; 1.000 ] 
 Treatment outcome of the always-adopters  0.970 (0.033)  [ 0.910 ; 1.000 ] 
Conservation tillage 
    
 Treatment effect of the compliers (LATE)  0.415 (0.288)  [<0.001 ; 0.948 ] 
 Non-treatment outcome of the never-adopters  0.556 (0.170)  [0.310 ; 0.871 ] 
 Treatment outcome of the always-adopters  0.551 (0.091)  [0.399 ; 0.712 ] 
Immediate incorporation 
    
 Treatment effect of the compliers (LATE)  0.110 (0.270)  [-0.309 ; 0.587 ] 
 Non-treatment outcome of the never-adopters  0.441 (0.151)  [ 0.200 ; 0.698 ] 
 Treatment outcome of the always-adopters  0.607 (0.087)  [ 0.465 ; 0.743 ] 
Riparian buffer 
    
 Treatment effect of the compliers (LATE)  0.208 (0.153)  [ -0.072 ; 0.440 ] 
 Non-treatment outcome of the never-adopters  0.707 (0.174)  [ 0.431 ; 1.000 ] 
 Treatment outcome of the always-adopters  0.743 (0.072)  [ 0.625 ; 0.853 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers 
    
 Treatment effect of the compliers (LATE)  0.368 (0.203)  [ 0.052 ; 0.721 ] 
 Non-treatment outcome of the never-adopters  0.688 (0.171)  [ 0.408 ; 1.007 ] 
 Treatment outcome of the always-adopters  0.629 (0.093)  [ 0.479 ; 0.792 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures 
    
 Treatment effect of the compliers (LATE)  0.329 (0.182)  [ 0.031 ; 0.651 ] 
 Non-treatment outcome of the never-adopters  0.751 (0.166)  [ 0.483 ; 1.000 ] 
 Treatment outcome of the always-adopters  0.843 (0.068)  [ 0.727 ; 0.941 ] 
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Table 4. AE advisory clubs network horizontal diffusion effects  
BMPs  Average impact  Bootstrapped 95% CI of the average impact 
Soil and manure analyses  0.019  [ -0.003 ; 0.042 ] 
Conservation tillage  -0.150  [ -0.192 ; -0.108 ] 
Immediate incorporation  -0.005  [ -0.068 ; 0.058 ] 
Riparian buffer  0.227  [ 0.194 ; 0.260 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.047  [ 0.0145 ; 0.078 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.149  [ 0.094 ; 0.204 ] 
The value in bold is non significant. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Type of farmers according to the reaction to an external intervention 
ϖ =i n   ,0 ,1if 0 and 0= =i iParticipation Participation    Never-participant 
ϖ =i c   ,0 ,1if 0 and 1= =i iParticipation Participation    Complier 
ϖ =i d   ,0 ,1if 1 and 0= =i iParticipation Participation    Defier 
ϖ =i a   ,0 ,1if 1 and 1= =i iParticipation Participation    Always-participant 
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Table A2.  Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
 
Variables (unity) 
 Mean  Standard 
deviation 
 Min.  P50  Max. 
Producers attributes           
Age  (1: <35, 2:[35;45[, 3:[ 45;55[, 4:[55;65[, 5:≥65)  3.09  1.12  1.00  3.00  5.00 
Gender (Female=1)  0.11  0.31  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Management experience (years)  22.89  12.04  0.00  22.00  59.00 
Education (> primary=1)  0.88  0.33  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Place of residence (Farm=1)  0.86  0.35  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Environmental sensitivity (participation in biodiversity 
project or observation of decrease in biodiversity =1 ) 
 0.19  0.39  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Pan  (Use of information provided by the Pan=1)  0.45  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00 
External characteristics           
Production loss (losses due to animals or plants =1)  0.48  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00 
River quality (accumulation signs =1)  0.78  0.42  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Region  -  -  -  -  - 
Farm attributes           
Revenue ($1,000) 
(1:<50, 2:[50;100[, 3:[100;250[, 4:[250;500[, 5:≥500)  
 4.18  1.97  1.00  4.00  7.00 
Main production  (animal production=1)   0.7  0.46  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Share of the main production in the (TGR)  0.85  0.18  0.20  0.90  1.00 
Land quality (degradation signs=1)   0.41  0.49  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Ownership type (Individually owned=1)  0.41  0.49  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Rent (share of rented land)  0.16  0.24  0.00  0.00  1.00 
AEES activities           
Member of an AEAC (=1)  0.36  0.48  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Having an AEP (=1)  0.47  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Diffusion effect (knowing=1)  0.40  0.49  0.00  0.00  1.00 
BMPs (binary variable)           
Soil and manure analyses   0.78  0.41  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Immediate incorporation of manure  0.51  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.53  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Riparian buffers implementation  0.84  0.36  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Conservation tillage  0.40  0.49  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Hydraulic infrastructures   0.75  0.43  0.00  1.00  1.00 
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Table A3. Non-parametric Probit estimation of factors affecting the adoption of an AE support 
plan  
 
Variables 
 Coefficient  Marginal 
effect 
 Standard 
error 
 Prob.>chi-
square 
Age     
     (0; 35[ -  -  -  - 
     [35; 45[ -0,672  -0.247  0,479  0,160 
     [45; 55[ -1,227  -0.441  0,489  0,012 
     [55; 65[ -0,852  -0.308  0,600  0,156 
     [65;) -1,181  -0.367  0,843  0,161 
Gender (Female=1) -0,120  -0.047  0,425  0,777 
Education (>primary=1) 0,961  0.323  0,464  0,038 
Management experience (years) 0,047  0.018  0,017  0,008 
Residence (Farm=1) -0,456  -0.180  0,362  0,208 
Information (Use RAP=1) -0,412  -0.161  0,238  0,083 
Environmental sensitivity (=1)  0,701  0.274  0,302  0,020 
Revenue (TGR) in $        
     [0; 50000[ -0,843  -0.304  0,394  0,033 
     [50000; 100000[ -0,468  -0.174  0,439  0,286 
     [100000; 250000[ -  -  -  - 
     [250000; 500000[ -0,108  -0.042  0,329  0,744 
     [500000;) 0,554  0.218  0,385  0,150 
Main production in TGR (%) -0,146  -0.057  0,700  0,835 
Ownership type (sole = 1) 0,444  0.174  0,283  0,117 
Share of rented land (%) 0,138  0.054  0,388  0,722 
Main production        
     Bovine production (=1) -0,598  -0.218  0,480  0,213 
     Milk production (=1) 0,105  0.042  0,354  0,767 
     Hog production (=1) -  -  -  - 
     Other animal productions (=1) -1,389  -0.398  0,623  0,026 
     Cereals (=1) 0,089  0.035  0,406  0,826 
     Other crop productions (=1) -1,150  -0.370  0,533  0,031 
Land quality (Degradation=1) 0,606  0.235  0,254  0,017 
River quality (Degradation=1) 0,061  0.024  0,248  0,804 
Region -0,013  -0.005  0,020  0,508 
Pseudo R2 0.209       
Notes: Values in bold (italic) denote significance at 5% (10%) levels (two-tailed test). The marginal effect is 
calculated at the discrete change of binary variables form zero to one. 
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Table A4. Non-parametric Probit estimation of factors affecting adherence in an AE advisory club  
 
Variables 
 Coefficient  Marginal 
effect 
 Standard 
error 
 Prob.>chi-
square 
Age     
     (0; 35[ -  -  -  - 
     [35; 45[ -1.467  -0.367  0.080  0.003 
     [45; 55[ -1.395  -0.420  0.120  0.005 
     [55; 65[ -1.679  -0.420  0.102  0.009 
     [65;) -2.567  -0.378  0.051  0.005 
Gender (Female=1) 0.079  0.028  0.155  0.854 
Education (>primary=1) -0.346  -0.128  0.167  0.426 
Management experience (years) 0.038  0.013  0.006  0.026 
Residence (Farm=1) 0.521  0.161  0.099  0.165 
Information (Use RAP=1) -0.209  -0.073  0.083  0.387 
Environmental sensitivity (=1)  0.454  0.167  0.118  0.140 
Revenue (TGR) in $        
     [0; 50000[ -0.793  -0.239  0.103  0.057 
     [50000; 100000[ -0.002  -0.001  0.151  0.997 
     [100000; 250000[        
     [250000; 500000[ -0.225  -0.076  0.112  0.513 
     [500000;) 0.434  0.160  0.142  0.240 
Main production in TGR (%) 0.393  0.137  0.251  0.586 
Ownership type (sole = 1) 0.040  0.014  0.098  0.887 
Share of rented land (%) 0.230  0.080  0.136  0.558 
Main production        
     Bovine production (=1) -0.682  -0.199  0.112  0.161 
     Milk production (=1) -0.463  -0.155  0.115  0.197 
     Hog production (=1)        
     Other animal productions (=1) -1.803  -0.328  0.051  0.026 
     Cereals (=1) -0.282  -0.093  0.126  0.487 
     Other crop productions (=1) -1.126  -0.284  0.083  0.031 
Land quality (Degradation=1) -0.284  -0.099  0.086  0.254 
River quality (Degradation=1) 0.221  0.078  0.090  0.378 
Region -0.054  -0.019  0.007  0.008 
Production losses 0.753  0.258  0.084  0.003 
Pseudo R2 0.253       
Notes: Values in bold (italic) denote significance at 5% (10%) levels (two-tailed test). The marginal effect is 
calculated at the discrete change of binary variables form zero to one. 
 
